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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STEVE WALLACE CARTER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070323-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of use of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with prior convictions, a 
second degree felony (R. 97). This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e)(West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where defendant wrote to the court that he was satisfied 
with his counsel's representation and later agreed he wanted to 
proceed with sentencing, can he now argue on appeal that the 
court should have further considered his early complaints about 
his counsel's representation? 
When an error is invited, no standard of review applies. 
2. Where defendant was represented by counsel, did the trial 
court err by declining to address his pro se motion to withdraw 
his plea? 
Whether a court must consider a represented defendant's pro 
se pleadings presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Petty, 2001 UT App 396, 1 4, 38 P.3d 998. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are 
dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with one count each of 
possession or use of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a 
third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). After several amendments to the 
information, he was ultimately charged with possession or use of 
a controlled substance in a drug-free zone with priors, a first 
degree felony, and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free 
zone with priors, a class A misdemeanor (R. 102-03). He entered 
a guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) with priors, a second degree felony 
(R. 97, 121-23). A year later, the court sentenced him to one-
to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 186). This timely 
appeal followed (R. 198). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The prosecutor recited the facts most succinctly at the 
change of plea hearing: 
On December 15th, 2004, the defendant was at 
437 Binford, apartment number 6, when 
officers went over to the location. Officers 
found drugs in the bathroom where the 
defendant had come from. . . . Officer Mahon 
talked to the defendant. The defendant 
admitted that he had used drugs the night 
before, methamphetamine, specifically. 
Methamphetamine was what was tested positive 
in the two baggies and in the two meth pipes 
that were located. There was also a syringe 
located in the defendant's backpack. The 
defendant admitted that he had used the 
syringe at some point to inject the 
methamphetamine as well. 
R. 211: 10. Following this recitation, the court asked 
defendant, "[I]s that what happened?" Defendant replied, "That's 
exactly what happened" (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by not inquiring into his early complaints about his attorney. 
Defendant, however, invited the error of which he now complains. 
While defendant did complain about his attorney, those complaints 
were followed by a letter in which he expressed satisfaction with 
his counsel's judgment. Moreover, he explicitly agreed to 
proceed with sentencing, thus further signaling to the court that 
any previous concerns had been satisfactorily resolved. He 
cannot now reverse his position and fault the court for not 
3 
investigating the very complaints he led the court to believe had 
been resolved. 
Even assuming arguendo that the court should have made 
further efforts to determine the merits of defendant's early 
complaints, any error was harmless. Defense counsel represented 
defendant in precisely the way he requested. Defendant has 
failed to establish either that his counsel should have been 
replaced or that he would have enjoyed a better outcome absent 
his counsel's representation. His claim, therefore, fails. 
Defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion 
by not addressing his pro se motion to withdraw his plea. The 
State does not dispute that the form of defendant's pleadings 
communicated his desire to withdraw his plea. Where defendant 
was represented by counsel at the time he filed the pro se 
motion, however, the court was under no obligation to consider 
it. The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to do so. In any event, because defendant has adduced 
no evidence to substantiate the claim on which his motion was 
based, it would necessarily have failed on the merits. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WHERE DEFENDANT EXPRESSED IN 
WRITING HIS SATISFACTION WITH 
COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL, HE CANNOT 
NOW FAULT THE COURT FOR IGNORING 
HIS EARLIER COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS 
COUNSEL; EVEN ON THE MERITS, HIS 
COMPLAINT FAILS BECAUSE HE HAS NOT 
ESTABLISHED THAT THE COURT'S 
ALLEGED ABUSE CAUSED HIM HARM 
A. Defendant invited the claimed error by asserting 
different positions in the trial court and on appeal. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by failing to inquire into his complaints about his counsel's 
representation. See Br. of Aplt. at 19. This argument fails 
because defendant invited the very error of which he now 
complains. Where defendant expressed in writing his satisfaction 
with his attorney and explicitly agreed that he wanted to proceed 
with imposition of sentence, he cannot now argue that the court 
should have considered the complaints that preceded his letter of 
approval. 
"The doctrine of invited error ^prohibits a party from 
setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on 
appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 
1991)(quoting State v. Henderson. 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 
1990)); accord State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to discourage a 
defendant in a criminal case from inviting prejudicial error and 
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then implanting it in the record "as a form of appellate 
insurance against an adverse sentence." State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989); accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 
(noting the rule "discourages parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for 
reversal on appeal"). 
In this case, the day after entering his guilty plea, 
defendant filed two pro se motions requesting replacement of his 
court-appointed attorney.1 R. 126, 127-30. At a subsequent 
hearing at which he was still represented, defendant requested 
and was granted a continuance to allow him to retain private 
counsel. R. 135. 
The law is clear that when a defendant expresses 
dissatisfaction with his representation, 
the court must make some reasonable, non-
suggestive efforts to determine the nature of 
the defendant's complaints and to apprise 
itself of the facts necessary to determine 
whether the defendant's relationship with his 
or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to 
the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution or even to such an extent that 
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
would be violated but for substitution. 
1
 Early in the case, defendant had orally moved the trial 
court to remove and replace his first court-appointed public 
defender. R. 76. The court interpreted this request as an 
assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Different 
counsel appeared at the next hearing, and the court thereafter 
recognized him as defendant's legal representative. See R. 79. 
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State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987) (citation 
omitted); accord State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, 3 13, 27 
P.3d 573. In this case, the record does not reveal any immediate 
effort by the court to explore defendant's complaints beyond the 
grant of a continuance for defendant to seek private counsel. 
Two months later, before sentencing, defendant wrote a 
letter to the court, copied to defense counsel, in which he 
dispelled any concerns about the effectiveness of his court-
appointed counsel: 
I am writing you in regards to the case as 
above. For some time I experienced major 
anxiety concerning my plea. This as I [sic] 
could not believe that the mere use of drugs 
could carry such a heavy penalty. I believe 
my attorney . . . has counseled me correctly. 
Not only as regards the court/legal 
penalties, but also to my health. 
Please accept my apology to the Court for the 
trouble I have caused. . . . I will accept 
any treatment, supervision, or consequences 
Your Honor deems necessary. 
R. 139. This letter of support for his counsel's representation 
unequivocally negated defendant's earlier expressions of 
dissatisfaction. A trier of fact, reading such a letter, could 
conclude only that defendant's earlier concerns about his court-
appointed legal representative had been resolved. 
Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the following exchange 
occurred: 
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The Court: Okay, [defendant] is back. 
Where we at, [defense 
counsel]? 
Def. Cnsl: He's decided he wants to go 
ahead with sentencing, Your 
Honor. 
The Court: Is that the case, [defendant]-
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: — that's what we're doing? 
Okay. 
R. 212: 2.2 Defendant's explicit decision to go ahead with 
sentencing confirms that any concerns he had previously expressed 
with regard to his counsel's representation had been effectively 
allayed. To argue on appeal that the court abused its discretion 
by proceeding to sentencing without considering defendant's early 
complaints about his attorney ignores both defendant's subsequent 
expression of confidence in his attorney and his explicit 
acquiescence to sentencing. Because defendant's conduct in 
writing to the court and agreeing to proceed with sentencing led 
the court into the very error he now asserts, his claim should be 
rejected.3 Perdue, 813 P.3d at 1205; Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285. 
2
 The beginning of this interchange seems to suggest that 
the proceedings had been temporarily adjourned, pending a 
discussion between counsel and client. A careful review of the 
tapes of the morning's proceedings, however, reveals no such 
antecedent event. 
3
 Moreover, defendant's position on appeal is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the position he asserted at trial. For this 
reason as well, the Court may decline to consider it. See, e.g., 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah 1994) (quoting State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987))(inconsistent 
position taken in trial and appellate courts "smacks of invited 
8 
B. Defendant failed to establish prejudice. 
Even on the merits, defendant's argument fails because his 
attorney's representation accorded with his wishes, even if it 
did not produce the result for which defendant hoped. Assuming 
arguendo that the trial court did not engage in the necessary 
"efforts" to determine the merits of defendant's early 
complaints, the Court should find that any error was harmless. 
That is, any abuse of discretion by the court in failing to 
further explore the nature of defendant's early complaints did 
not prejudice defendant because defense counsel actively 
represented him in precisely the way in which he repeatedly 
demanded and because defendant has not shown that the documents 
he sought would have substantiated his claim of mental illness. 
Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
and dismiss the case while he was represented by counsel. R. 
149-51. At the same time, he wrote to the court, stating that 
defense counsel should investigate his mental health records and 
requesting that the court not sentence him until such 
investigation had been completed. R. 154-55. 
In accord with defendant's wishes, defense counsel moved to 
discover defendant's mental health records.4 R. 160. When that 
error, which is ^procedurally unjustified and viewed with 
disfavor'"). 
4
 The pro se pleadings filed after defendant acknowledged 
the competency of his counsel mainly address the need for counsel 
to investigate defendant's mental health records prior to 
sentencing. See R. 154-55, 178, 188, 190. Such investigation, 
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action failed to produce a timely response, counsel filed a 
motion to compel. R. 171. The court also acknowledged 
defendant's request by continuing sentencing so that his counsel 
could "obtain the defendant's mental health records from the 
prison so a determination can be made as to whether or not to 
proceed with sentencing" (R. 158). The court then granted 
multiple continuances, awaiting the mental health records. R. 
163, 169, 174, 176, 181. Finally, six months later, defense 
counsel received the records. The minute entry of the next 
status hearing states: "[Defense counsel] has received the 
information regarding the defendant's mental health from the Utah 
State Prison. [Defense counsel] indicates that he will not be 
filing a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" (R. 183). The only 
reasonable inference to be drawn from this entry is that 
defendant's mental health records provided no evidentiary support 
for defendant's claim that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. 
Because defense counsel sought and received the very 
documents on which defendant's complaint about him was based, 
defendant surmised, would substantiate his claim that mental 
illness prevented him from entering a knowing and voluntary plea 
and that the court, accordingly, should have permitted him to 
withdraw it. Defense counsel was, in fact, doing exactly what 
defendant had requested, although he perhaps did not personally 
communicate his activity as well as defendant would have liked. 
See R. 160, 171. Thus, the crux of defendant's complaint is 
really not that his counsel failed to represent his interests, 
but that he did not adequately communicate with defendant in the 
course of his competent representation. 
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defendant has wholly failed to establish either that his counsel 
should have been replaced or that he would have enjoyed a better 
outcome absent his counsel's representation. See State v. 
Valencia, 2001 UT App. 159, f 14, 27 P.3d 573 (finding that any 
inadequacy in the inquiry into indigent defendant's 
dissatisfaction with counsel was harmless where good cause did 
not require substitution of counsel); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) ("Any 
error . . . which does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded'7) . Absent any showing by defendant 
that his mental health records would have provided evidentiary 
support for his claim that mental illness prevented him from 
entering a knowing and voluntary plea, his claim fails. 
POINT TWO 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED 
BY COUNSEL, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING 
TO DIRECTLY ADDRESS HIS PRO SE 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to 
consider his pro se pleadings and letters, which he maintains 
constituted "a valid motion to withdraw his guilty plea" (Br. of 
Aplt. at 13). The State does not dispute that the form of 
defendant's pleadings sufficed to communicate his desire to 
withdraw his plea. See Lundahl v. Ouinn, 2003 UT 11, i 4, 67 
P.3d 1000 (courts generally lenient with pro se litigants). The 
issue, however, is not the formal sufficiency of the pleadings 
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but whether the court had an obligation to consider them on the 
merits while defendant was represented by counsel. 
The timing of defendant's pro se pleadings is dispositive. 
Defendant filed his pro se motion to withdraw his plea and 
dismiss the case less than three months after explicitly 
affirming the adequacy of his counsel's representation. R. 149-
51. Because defendant was represented by counsel at that timef 
he "was required to either file motions through his counsel or 
seek to dismiss his counsel and proceed pro se." State v. 
Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, 1 32, 143 P.3d 302. He did neither. 
This court has stated that 
[t]he defendant may choose self-
representation or the assistance of counsel, 
but is not entitled to a ^hybrid 
representation' where he could both enjoy the 
assistance of counsel and file pro se 
motions. The only exception to this rule is 
that a defendant may file a pro se motion to 
disqualify his appointed counsel. 
Id. at 1 33 (citing People v. Serio, 830 N.E.2d 749 (111. App. 
Ct. 2005)). See also State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808 (Utah 
1999) (recognizing that the constitutional right to counsel and 
to self-representation are "mutually exclusive" (citing Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21)). 
This court's holding in Wareham comports with a majority of 
state courts that also disfavor a right to hybrid representation. 
See, e.g.. People v. Handy, 664 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (111. App. Ct. 
1996)("The trial court correctly ignored defendant's pro se 
motion . . . Defendant was represented by counsel at all 
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pertinent times. Accordingly, defendant had no authority to file 
pro se motions, and the court not only did not need to consider 
them, it should not have considered them.'7); State v. Harvey, 713 
P.2d 517, 521-22 (Mont. 1986) (holding that trial court correctly 
refused to consider defendant's pro se motions because "as long 
as defendant was represented by counsel defendant could not act 
pro se"). Indeed, some jurisdictions have even adopted explicit 
rules that bar represented parties from filing pro se documents. 
See U.S. v. Aaofskv, 20 F.3d 866, 872 n.7 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing 
rules promulgated in Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington). While Utah has 
no explicit rule, this Court's decision in Wareham puts it 
directly in line with the nationwide majority on the issue of 
hybrid representation. Because defendant was represented by 
counsel when he filed his pro se motion to withdraw his plea, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider 
it.5 
5
 Moreover, the claim fails on the merits because defendant 
has not adduced a shred of evidence to substantiate his claim 
that mental illness precluded him from entering a knowing and 
voluntary plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of use of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) with prior convictions, a second degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^2 day o f MaY' 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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